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FOUR PROBLEMS OF ABDUCTION:
A BRIEF HISTORY
Anya Plutynski
Debates concerning the character, scope, and warrant of abductive inference have been
active since Peirce first proposed that there was a third form of inference, distinct from
induction and deduction. Abductive reasoning has been dubbed weak, incoherent, and
even nonexistent. Part, at least, of the problem of articulating a clear sense of abductive
inference is due to difficulty in interpreting Peirce. Part of the fault must lie with his
critics, however. While this article will argue that Peirce indeed left a number of puzzles
for interpreters, it will also contend that interpreters should be careful to distinguish
discussion of the formal and strictly epistemic question of whether and how abduction
is a sound form of inference from discussions of the practical goals of abduction, as
Peirce understood them. This article will trace a history of critics and defenders of
Peirce’s notion of abduction and discuss how Peirce both fueled the confusion and
in fact anticipated and responded to several recurring objections.
1. Introduction
Why should philosophers of science study their history? Popular but unsatis-
fying reasons include that it permits us to learn from our mistakes or that we
give credit where credit is due. Of course, we should credit the authors of
important distinctions, arguments, or concepts, but we should also attempt
to see through their eyes as a way of viewing our own problems and problem
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space anew. An ongoing dialogue with its history should inform the philoso-
phy of science today.
Peirce may seem an unlikely candidate for this ongoing conversation, for, by
almost any measure, he was a bad conversationalist. He had a habit of making
vague promises and leaving them unfulfilled; he was master of the tangen-
tial discussion; he changed the definitions of his key terms; he subscribed to
genuinely bizarre metaphysics and epistemology. However, he also had keen
insights, and reading his work is a helpful reminder that distinctions and norms
that we take for granted as twenty-first-century philosophers of science are
not givens.
Peirce was writing before the distinction between the context of discovery
and the context of justification had been invented (or, perhaps, identified);
he was writing before philosophers of science worried about whether their
central task was descriptive or normative; he was writing before epistemology
was “naturalized.” These three differences between Peirce’s context and that
of philosophy of science today are instructive, particularly in the context of
debates about abduction. Many, if not most, of the objections that have been
raised against Peirce (and counterarguments in his defense) can be traced to
competing views about the legitimacy of a demarcation between the context
of discovery and that of justification, whether normative projects in philoso-
phy of science can or should be addressed independently from descriptive
accounts of scientific practice, and finally, what it could mean to be a “natu-
ralist” about epistemology. Where you stand concerning these issues will, it
turns out, have rather important implications for how you fall on the matter
of abductive reasoning: its warrant, relevance, and import for science.
2. Origins: Abduction
Peirce first mentioned abduction, or what he called “reasoning by hypothesis,”
in 1866. He described this form of inference as from result and rule to case:
Light is polarizable. (Result; or, “Fact explained”)
Ether waves are polarizable. (Rule)
Light is ether waves. (Case) (1982–2010, 1:427; hereafter WP followed
by volume and page number)
Then, in 1878, he gives a similar illustration of inference to hypothesis:
Rule: All the beans in this bag are white.
Result: These beans are white.
HO PO S l Four Problems of Abduction
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Case: These beans are from this bag. (Peirce 1931–58, 2:623; hereafter
CP followed by volume and page number)
Kapitan (1997) paraphrases this:
All As which are B are C.
This A is C.
Therefore, the A is B. (480)
Abduction is contrasted with deduction and induction, which involve an
inference from either rule and case to result (All As which are B are C; This A is
B; Therefore, this A is C) or case and result to rule (This A is C; This A is B; All
As which are B are C), respectively. Peirce calls this third form of inference
“making an hypothesis” (1992–98, 1:188; hereafter EP followed by volume
and page number) and later “abduction” (WP 2:108), which he translates from
Aristotle’s apagoge (Prior Analytics 2.25 69 20–36).1
Peirce insists, “All the ideas of science come to it by way of abduction.” And
he roughly characterizes abduction as “studying facts and devising a theory
to explain them” (CP 5:145). Deduction is said to draw out consequences of
a rule and case; it is “necessary reasoning.” Induction, in contrast, is “experi-
mental testing of a theory.”And “hypothesis is where we find some very curious
circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition that it was the case
of a certain general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition” (EP 1:189).
Peirce left a legacy of puzzles about abduction, yielding a contentious litera-
ture. Debates in the literature have often circled around one or more of four
central interpretive challenges, which I will call the formalization indeter-
minacy problem, the boundary problem, the justification problem, and the
descriptive problem. First, how (if at all) ought abductive inference to be for-
malized; second, what is the boundary between abduction and other forms of
inference; third, is abductive inference a sound form of inference, or how could
it be made so; and fourth, does abductive reasoning describe features of the
actual practice of science, and, if so, which features? Of course, these questions
are overlapping; how one formalizes abduction bears on whether it is a sound
form of inference, as well as whether one views it as distinct from other in-
ference forms. Moreover, all of these questions bear on how we characterize
abductive inference in scientific practice.
1. Peirce uses the term “retroduction” only after it is pointed out to him that his translation of
apagoge as abduction is problematic. For a detailed discussion of the differences and similarities
between Aristotle and Peirce’s logic, see Kraus (2003).
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A central problem with characterizing abduction, as Fann (1970) and
Anderson (1986) have pointed out, is that Peirce subtly changes his character-
ization of abduction over the course of his career. Early in his career, Peirce
places more emphasis on the formally distinct character and role of abductive
inference. In 1866, it appears as the above simple-inference form. After the turn
of the century, Peirce seems to place more emphasis on the role of abductive
inference in scientific discovery, and he characterizes the logical form of the
inference rather differently (see below). One of the major criticisms of abduc-
tion in the literature has been over reconciling these two characterizations.
Some scholars have attempted to reconcile the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Peirce by arguing that he saw abduction as a two-step process: the
generation and then the selection of hypotheses. Kapitan (1992) calls this
“abductive discovery” and “abductive preference.” This reconciliation helps
make some sense of Peirce’s ambiguity.
However, it also generates another set of problems. If abduction is a two-
stage process, how are the two stages different? Do they use the same argument
form or different ones? Are they guided by different logics? Is it even clear that
one can demarcate such neat stages in the practice of science?
Another debate concerns whether Peirce thought of abduction as reason
guided at all. In a 1903 paper, Peirce characterizes abduction as both clever
guesswork—“the abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of
insight” (CP 5:180–212)—and a logical form of reason-guided inference: “It
must be remembered that abduction, although it is very little hampered by
logical rules, nevertheless is a logical inference asserting its conclusion only
problematically or conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly
definite logical form” (CP 5:188).
These apparently inconsistent claims have generated generations of debate,
debate that has been closely tied to a shifting balance of views about the scope
and character of philosophy of science, as a discipline. In 1958, Frankfurt asked
the question, Is abduction an act of insight or an inference? Or, in his own
words, Frankfurt states: “We are, then, faced with the seeming paradox that
Peirce holds both that hypotheses are the products of a wonderful imaginative
faculty in man and that they are products of a certain sort of logical inference”
(1958a, 594). This makes the dichotomy seem rather starker than it need
be since one might experience an inference as a “leap” of insight, without
being aware of the logical steps of making an argument, but it is not surpris-
ing that a philosopher of science would ask the question just this way in the
1950s. Anderson, another interpreter of Peirce, argues that the two are not
mutually exclusive: “Peirce does not hold insight and inference to be mutually
HO PO S l Four Problems of Abduction
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exclusive. … Abduction is both an insight and an inference. This is a fact to
be explained, not to be explained away” (1986, 156).
Anderson’s suggestion seems to be more than a mere claim about the nature
of abduction: it is a call for historicizing and contextualizing philosophy of
science. Anderson was writing in response to a long tradition that criticized
Peirce’s failure of precision, claiming that Peirce was interested not exclusively
in the normative question of how discovery should go but also in the
descriptive problem of how it does go. For Peirce, knowledge of the psy-
chological character and the detailed context of scientific theory making
and discovery were not irrelevant to a philosophical understanding of the
growth of knowledge. Indeed, in some ways, Peirce here anticipates a contem-
porary turn in philosophy toward the social and the cognitive sciences. If, in
fact, the process of abduction often occasions a feeling of “insight,” perhaps
looking to the sources and patterns of such feelings may tell us something
interesting about the logic of science and not merely its phenomenology. Some
psychologists have suggested that strong feelings often accompany the for-
mation of convictions (Burton 2008). This does not, of course, guarantee
the certainty of such convictions, but that there are such psychological features
of discovery, and perhaps even identification of why and how these phenom-
enological experiences are instantiated or prompted, may lead us to learn some-
thing interesting about patterns of discovery, apart from their logic. Peirce was,
arguably, ahead of his time in this regard. (For some contemporary examples
of how philosophers of science have drawn on cognitive psychology, see, e.g.,
Gopnik and Schulz [2007].)
Next, I explicate four interpretive problems concerning Peirce’s articulation
of abduction. See table 1, for the four problems and for how different authors
responded to these problems, discussed at greater length below.
2.1. The Formalization Indeterminacy Problem
Peirce describes the inferential structure of abduction differently over the
course of his career. For example, in the first paper where he mentions abduc-
tion, he describes the method of hypothesis as the third permutation of the
syllogism mentioned above. In 1903, he describes the method of hypothesis
as follows:
The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But, if H were true, C would be a matter of course, hence.
There is reason to suspect that H is true. (EP 2:231)
Plutynski l F A L L 2011
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This argument form has been challenged on a number of fronts. The hypoth-
esis is included among the premises, so Frankfurt (1958a) argues that it cannot
be that hypotheses are the result of abduction, as Peirce claims. Second, as a
variety of critics have pointed out, the argument seems to permit too much.
Indeed, Peirce himself anticipated this objection: “It may be said that the
argument would prove too much; for if it were valid, it would follow that no
hypothesis could be so fantastic as not to have presented itself ” (CP 5:191).
Any number of absurd hypotheses could potentially explain some fact; that a
hypothesis could do so, however, is no reason to take it to be plausible. Various
authors have attempted to add a third, “corrective” premise in light of this very
objection.
However, Peirce anticipated this worry and elaborated his own set of criteria
for assessing the relative merits of hypotheses. As early as 1878, Peirce sug-
gested that there were “rules for the application of abduction,… in order that
the process should lead to a probable result” (EP 1:193). He writes, “When we
adopt a certain hypothesis, it is not alone because it will explain the observed
facts, but also because the contrary hypothesis would probably lead to results
contrary to those observed” (EP 1:191). In other words, Peirce anticipates
an important insight about what happens after abduction: confirmation—
the evaluation of hypotheses is always contrastive (see, e.g., Sober 1994). Of
course, more needs to be said about what one decides to include in the contrast
class and how to sort among the alternatives, as discussed below.
2.2. The Boundary Problem
The formalization indeterminacy problem is closely tied to the boundary
problem: how to distinguish abduction from other forms of inference. It is un-
clear what falls under the umbrella of abduction. In particular, one puzzle that
has particularly troubled interpreters is whether—and if so, how—abduction
is distinct from induction. Peirce, in 1878, describes induction very narrowly
as what some have called the “straight rule,” or “induction by enumeration.”
He writes that induction merely “classifies,” while abduction “explains”
(EP 1:194), and he credits abduction with the arrival at general theories, as
opposed to mere classification. Hypothesis, he explains, is when “we stretch
induction quite beyond the limits of our observation” (EP 1:197). The method
of hypothesis, he writes, allows us to arrive at knowledge of “causes and forces”
and “enables us to see the why of things,” whereas induction is merely “the
process by which we find the general characters of classes and establish nat-
ural classifications” (WP 1:428). Peirce even categorizes the sciences in terms
of which form of inference predominates. “Merely classificatory sciences” are
Plutynski l F A L L 2011
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purely inductive—systematic botany, zoology, mineralogy and chemistry—
whereas geology and biology (largely historical sciences) are “sciences of
hypothesis” (EP 1:199). Despite his insistence that induction and abduction
are distinct, early on, Peirce also says that the boundary between the twomodes
of inference can be difficult to discern: “The analogy of hypothesis with induc-
tion is so strong that some logicians confound them” (EP 1:192). To compli-
cate matters further, later in his career, Peirce claims that he confused induction
and abduction before 1900. One central puzzle in the literature on abduction,
thus, has concerned the boundary between induction and abduction.
2.3. The Justification Problem
The formalization and boundary problem are closely tied to the justification
problem: Is abduction a good form of inference? Some (again, Frankfurt
1958b) argue that the argument form affirms the consequent. That is, if the
argument is “If H, then C is true. C is true. Therefore H,” then the argument
affirms the consequent. Peirce anticipates and replies to the objection as fol-
lows: “It is to be remarked that it is only in deduction that there is no difference
between a valid argument and a strong one. … An argument is none the less
logical for being weak, provided it does not pretend to strength that it does not
possess.… An argument is fallacious only so far as it is mistakenly, though not
illogically, inferred to have professed what it did not perform” (CP 5:192).
Peirce here is suggesting that abduction does affirm the consequent, but abductive
reasoning is not deductive reasoning and so is not subject to the same standards.
Indeed, different argument types—inductive, deductive, and abductive—have
different goals and thus should be judged by different standards of adequacy.
Abduction is not to be judged on the same merits as deduction. (For a very
similar argument in the contemporary psychological literature, see, e.g., Hahn
and Oaksford [2007].)
The above response leaves unanswered the following question: On what
merits is abduction to be judged? What then makes an abductive argument a
strong one? How, for instance, are we to avoid the “anything goes” fallacy men-
tioned above? In response to this criticism, Peirce wrote: “As to the… objection
that every hypothesis, however fantastic, must have presented itself … I have
only to say that this could only arise in a mind entirely unpracticed in the logic
of relations, and apparently quite oblivious of any other mode of inference than
abduction” (CP 5:193). (Alas, after a careful study of the logic of relations, this
particular claim is not yet altogether clear.) However, the general intuition
seems to be that to understand how to differentiate better from worse abduc-
tive inferences, one must first be practiced in other forms of inference and,
HO PO S l Four Problems of Abduction
234
This content downloaded from 128.252.101.9 on Mon, 04 Dec 2017 19:01:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
moreover, have deployed them properly in generating the appropriate contrast-
ing hypotheses.
Peirce explains that a variety of considerations enter into choice of hypoth-
esis: it must be capable of experimental test, it must explain the facts in ques-
tion, and it must be “economical.”
Now economy … depends upon three kinds of factors, cost; the value
of the thing proposed, in itself; and its effect upon other projects. …
Under the head of value, we must place those considerations which tend
toward an expectation that a given hypotheses may be true. These are of
two kinds, the purely instinctive and the reasoned. … Hypotheses …
[that] naturally recommend themselves to the mind … make up on us
the impression of simplicity—which here means facility of comprehen-
sion by the human mind,—of aptness, of reasonableness, of good sense.
From the instinctive we pass to the reasoned marks of truth in the
hypotheses. Of course, if we know any positive facts which render a given
hypothesis objectively probable, they recommend it for inductive testing.
When this is not the case, when the hypothesis seems to us likely, or
unlikely, this likelihood is an indication that the hypothesis accords or
discords with our preconceived ideas; and since those ideas are presum-
ably based upon some experience, it follows that, other things being
equal, there will be, in the long run, some economy in giving the hypoth-
esis a place in the order of precedence. … But experience must be our
chart in economical navigation. (CP 7:220–22)
While it may seem odd to consider probability of truth under the heading
of “economy,” one way of reading Peirce is as expressing an important insight
about how background knowledge, as well as practical constraint, informs how
science should be (and not, coincidentally, often is) practiced (for a discussion,
see Kronz and McLaughlin 2005).
When scientists consider which hypothesis to adopt and test, they are not
entirely free to consider any possible hypothesis. One only adopts a hypothesis
that one could, conceivably, test, under whatever practical constraints are in
play. Moreover, Peirce remarks that “instinctively” (i.e., at first) a hypothesis
appears “simple”—apt, reasonable, or “of good sense” to us. The hypothesis
may have instinctively appeared so, exactly because we must have reason to
believe it probable. That is, we may have good inductive reasons for accepting
it—it accords not only with our preconceived ideas, wherein these pre-
conceived ideas are often founded on theoretical or empirical knowledge that
forms the background against which new ideas are proposed or tested. However,
Plutynski l F A L L 2011
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it also may just be the first best option in a series of choices that are driven, in
part, by the cheapness and ease of testing. Abduction, on this account, involves
a process, including stages of reflection both practical and evidential.
2.4. The Descriptive Problem
This point leads naturally to the descriptive problem: characterizing the role
of abductive inference in scientific practice. Peirce was always cognizant that
a formalization of scientific reasoning is an idealization. A formal representation
can only apply to scientific practice if we treat such practice in a stepwise process
in which each stage may be clearly demarcated. Peirce was skeptical that such a
demarcation was possible. He was concerned with the practice of scientific rea-
soning. This is, at least in part, what led him to the view that induction and
deduction are insufficient, by themselves, to characterize scientific practice.
The logic of abduction is absolutely central, in his view, not only to the first
stages of science but also to the possibility of any kind of knowledge whatso-
ever. He writes that “it is the only logical operation which introduces any new
idea” (EP 2.216). Peirce argues that abductive inference played a role in the
discovery of the kinetic theory of gases and Kepler’s positing of an elliptical
orbit of Mars. Without abduction, in his view, we would be at sea—infinite
possible hypotheses would present themselves, with no plausible ranking.
Abduction is that “sorting” process that leads us to a hypothesis worth explor-
ing further.
I have characterized four puzzles Peirce bequeathed the literature on ab-
duction: the formalization indeterminacy problem, the boundary problem,
the justification problem, and the descriptive problem. With this character-
ization of Peirce’s puzzles in place, the project is twofold: First, I will briefly
elaborate on some central debates in the history of the literature on abduction.
Second, I will argue that many of the debates about the scope and warrant of
abductive inference since Peirce have hinged on prior commitments to in-
dependent questions, for example, concerning whether philosophers of science
ought to be concerned with the psychology of discovery and how or whether
empirical psychology bears on our understanding of scientific reasoning.
3. Discovery or Confirmation?
Peirce argues that in abductive reasoning we do not infer to, that is, accept as
true, or even assign probabilities to a given hypothesis. Rather, he argued that
in abduction, we are accepting a hypothesis “only problematically, that is to say,
as meriting an inductive examination” (CP 2:786), or, as he says elsewhere, “It
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is one act of inference to adopt a hypothesis on probation. Such an act may be
called an abduction. It is an act of the same kind, when a hypothesis is merely
suggested as possibly worth consideration. For even then some degree of favor
is extended to it. But when, in consequence of having found that a good many
predictions based on the hypothesis have been verified, a man begins to have
positive belief in it, that is an act of inference of a totally different kind: it is an
induction, or reasoning from a sample.”2 This passage suggests that Peirce
would view abduction as distinct from most contemporary accounts of infer-
ence to the best explanation (IBE). For many, if not most, accounts of IBE take
it to be thoroughly in the context of confirmation. Yet, according to the above,
once we take a hypothesis to be not only worth exploring but well confirmed,
we have moved from the context of abduction to induction.
Admittedly, Peirce struggled with whether these two forms of inference are
genuinely distinct. He writes, “Induction is, plainly, a much stronger kind of
inference than hypothesis; and this is the first reason for distinguishing between
them. Hypotheses are sometimes regarded as provisional resorts, which in the
progress of science are to be replaced by inductions. But this is a false view of the
subject. Hypothetic reasoning infers very frequently a fact not capable of di-
rect observation.…How is that hypothesis ever to be replaced by induction?”
(EP 1:198). Here, Peirce is struggling with several independent features of
inductive versus abductive inference; he seems to suggest at first that the
distinction is a mere matter of strength of inference, but then he qualifies his
statement, suggesting that the latter is distinctive in inferring from observable
to unobservable or from instances to a rule versus from complex facts to an
explanatory theory. His view here seems to be that the transition from accept-
ing a hypothesis “on probation” to viewing it as “verified” is a gradual one.
Peirce often characterizes abduction as distinctive in that it results in a rather
different course of action than mere induction, namely, the further investiga-
tion of a given hypothesis. Some take this to suggest that Peirce is advocating a
kind of “practical reasoning,” recommending a “course of action,” as opposed
to an epistemic state, as a result of abduction. Indeed, Hintikka (1998) argues
that abductive inference is not inference at all; it is instead a kind of questioning
strategy. And, Kapitan argues that “abductive-preference is a special type of
practical reasoning, which culminates not in acceptance of H per se, but in
an endorsement of a course of action” (1992, 14). In other words, on this line
of interpretation, abduction is a strategic practice (involving merely plausible
2. Peirce's unpublished writings, Annotated Catalogue, ed. Richard Robin, Institute for Studies in
Pragmaticism, MS 873.23, available in the microfilm edition of Peirce's papers at Harvard. Quoted
with permission from the Harvard University Department of Philosophy.
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belief ) that results in a proposed course of action—investigating a hypothesis
further. That is, on this reading, Peirce is not (as he avows) advancing a new
form of inference but, rather, a form of life, a practice for science.
Kapitan follows his characterization of Peirce’s “abduction preference” as
“practical reasoning” with the following statement: “The proper conclusion
might be that he lacked a clear and consistent picture of what is to be inferred
in abduction, or, for that matter, a clear distinction between belief and other
practical attitudes” (1992, 15). Peirce surely saw belief and practical attitudes as
connected. One often has good reason to “hold” a hypothesis, at least tenta-
tively, in the course of science, for the purposes of exploration, before one
has reason to “believe” it. This seems to mark off abduction from IBE.
However, some have argued that abductive inference and IBE are one and
the same. Niiniluoto, for instance, simply takes the two to be of a piece and
dispenses with any controversy over this issue quite quickly. He cites Peirce’s
claims that “abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to ex-
plain them” (CP 5:145) and “abduction is the process of forming explanatory
hypotheses” (CP 5:172) as evidence for this reading. Further, if one looks to
Peirce’s formalization of abduction (“The surprising fact, C, is observed. But, if
H were true, C would be a matter of course, hence. There is reason to suspect
that H is true”) and supplies the following third premise, as a corrective—“H is
more economical than the envisioned competitors,” where economical has to
do with not only cost or simplicity but consistency with prior (empirically
grounded) belief—the argument sounds much more like an inference to the
“best” explanation. The above passages certainly suggest that abductive infer-
ence is a form of IBE. And, it is true that Peirce stresses “explanationist” virtues
like breadth and “incomplexity” when assessing hypotheses (CP 7:220–22).
Peirce surely believed that abduction is guided by explanatory virtues. How-
ever, if it results in a state of belief, this belief is not necessarily that the hypoth-
esis in question is “probable,” in the sense of “better confirmed”; rather, it is
plausible in the sense of “worth investigating” or “provisional.” Peirce is con-
cerned to characterize the arrival at a theory worth exploring, in the context of
discovery. However, he also realizes that in characterizing scientific reasoning,
he is characterizing a process—something that transgresses the boundary be-
tween the context of discovery and the context of justification. Explanationist
virtues arguably play an important role in both early stages of assessing compet-
ing hypotheses and later ones.
In contrast, IBE, at least onmost contemporary accounts, is more concerned
with the context of justification (see, e.g., Lipton 2004). That is, most phi-
losophers of science today who are concerned with IBE are concerned with
it as a rule of inference for confirmation. Thus, while abduction is like IBE
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in that it involves determining whether and how the hypothesis would explain
the phenomenon in question, it is unlike IBE in that it does not result in ac-
ceptance of a hypothesis as either true or (even) highly probable. It is simply
worth investigating further. That abduction seems somehow lesser in aim than
IBE leads naturally to the question of whether explanationist virtues are enough
to justify belief. This latter concern has led to a great deal of the criticism of
abduction in the philosophical literature.
4. Abduction’s Warrant
Below, I will discuss two different views on abduction’s warrant. Essentially,
this involves pushing abduction over into either the context of justification
and trying to spell out in what sense arguments of this sort are warranted or
treating it as firmly in the context of discovery. Admittedly, these are extremes
along a continuum; it may be that no one has occupied either extreme, but they
illustrate two dominant tendencies in the literature on abduction and have
resulted in very different assessments of its warrant.
One extreme “reductionist” view is that abduction is either incoherent or
can be reduced to some other form of reasoning (e.g., induction, Bayesian
updating, relative likelihoods). Abduction is simply inferring to the likeliest
explanation, where this may be understood as that hypothesis most strongly
confirmed by the total evidence, at the stage at which we are concerned with
confirmation. This view has often (but need not necessarily) been defended
alongside the view that we ought to jettison any hope for a logic of discovery.
Rather, one ought to treat abductive inference as just another form of con-
firmatory inference—admittedly one that appears to deploy explanationist
virtues. However, the extreme reductionist stance generally assumes that any
“mysterious” explanatory properties of a theory can and should be reduced to
or explained in terms of empirical adequacy. We may and should formalize
abduction (sometimes understood as just IBE, by another name), using one
of the formal models of confirmation, for example, Bayesian updating or like-
lihood ratios.
One of the most famous critics of abductive inference is Popper. Popper
denied that there could be any logic of discovery: “The initial stage, the act
of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical anal-
ysis nor to be susceptible of it” (1934/1968, 31). Popper seems to be the most
thoroughly reductionist of all; the forming of hypotheses is not subject to
reason, on this view. However, Peirce, to some extent, anticipates this line
of objection and attempts to refute it. He writes: “Think of what trillions of
trillions of hypotheses might be made of which one only is true; and yet after
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two or three—or at the very most a dozen guesses, the physicist hits pretty
nearly on the correct hypothesis. By chance he would not have been likely
to do so in the whole time that has elapsed since the earth was solidified”
(CP 5:172). Peirce believes that were there no logic of discovery—that is, no
methods for the arrival at hypotheses worth investigating further—scientists
could never begin, much less finish, scientific inquiry. That is, if hypotheses
were proposed entirely at random, one would have to wait until the end of
the earth for science to even begin. Peirce concludes there must be some logic
or, at least, heuristic for scientific discovery. Abduction is this method.
5. The Heuristic Stance
Until relatively recently, one of the few figures that took up Peirce’s cause was
Norwood R. Hanson. In Patterns of Discovery (1958/1972), Hanson echoes
Peirce in the judgment that Kepler’s discovery of the inverse-square law as
one of the most important retroductive inferences in the history of science.
Hanson goes to great pains to describe the particular details of Kepler’s rea-
soning about Mars’s orbit and how, at great length, he finally came to the
elliptical figure. However, Hanson does not seem particularly interested in
the formalization or the justificatory problem, aside from arguing that what
he calls the “inductivist” and the HD account (Hanson uses “HD” to refer
to a hypothetico-deductive account of science, wherein observations are de-
duced from general laws; 1958/1972, 71) both fail as an account of such pro-
cesses as Kepler’s or “how laws are come by in the first place.” They fail as an
account of “physical practice.” The HD account is helpful when discussing “the
argument of a finished research report,” and the inductivist account is accept-
able where laws are arrived at “by enumeration of particulars,” but both fail to
capture the “first tentative proposal of laws,” the “reasons for proposing or trying
out a hypothesis” (70–71).
In other words, Hanson thinks that both inductive and deductive forms of
reasoning fail to capture something important about the practice of science.
Yet, in claiming this he insists that he is not claiming that scientific discovery
is not reason guided. Hanson explains that there is a process of reasoning lead-
ing to scientific theories—“retroduction”—reasoning from “explacanda to
explacans” (1958/1972, 85, 71). Kepler’s process of reasoning leading to the
elliptical orbit of Mars, “what Peirce calls the finest retroduction ever made”
(73), was a matter of considering possibilities first as mathematical idealiza-
tions, and then as real possibilities. Hanson describes Kepler’s reasoning thus:
“If we consider the orbit to be elliptical, then… let us suppose that our figure
were a perfect ellipse.… Let us see what follows therefrom” (79). This mode of
HO PO S l Four Problems of Abduction
240
This content downloaded from 128.252.101.9 on Mon, 04 Dec 2017 19:01:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
reasoning seems to parallel Peirce’s if-then formulation of abductive inference,
from 1903.
However, Hanson’s view was subject to a number of criticisms in the 1960s,
’70s, and ’80s. To claim that “retroduction” was reason guided, but not ame-
nable to the formalizations of confirmation then on offer, made the problem of
describing a logic of discovery, if such there was, very attractive. In the 1970s
and ’80s, the main representatives of this project were Gutting (1973, 1980),
Thagard (1978), Nickles (1980a, 1980b), and Achinstein (1985). However,
all of these authors more or less assimilated abduction and IBE, bringing their
view more in line with the reductionist stance. Even Niiniluoto (1999), more
recently, sees abduction as explanatory inference. However, as we have seen
above, “acceptance” of explanations was not what Peirce intended by abduc-
tion, which was only tentative entertainment, relative to the alternatives.
6. Abduction and Confirmation
At first, Harman (1965) argued that all inductive inference is inference to the
best of competing explanations. Even enumerative induction, in Harman’s
view, is a species of IBE. That is, when a person infers a generalization, his in-
ference is good to the extent that the generalization offers a better explanation
of the evidence than competing hypotheses do. Harman does not, at least at
first, give a formal account of how we are to judge one hypothesis as providing
a better explanation than another. Rather, he offers informal criteria, for exam-
ple, a hypothesis should be simpler, less ad hoc, and so on. That is, at this stage,
Harman seems very much in the antireductionist camp—appealing to explana-
tionist virtues like simplicity without attempting to formalize them.
However, in 1967, Harman is far more precise. An explanation is better
than competing explanations when the truth of the hypothesis in question
would have made the outcome more likely—or, more formally, when the
degree of confirmation (c) of some evidence (e(h)) entailed by the total evidence
(e) would be higher if h were true than if not-h were true (cððeðhÞ if sub hÞ;
eÞ≫ cððeðhÞ if sub not-hÞ; eÞ; Harman 1967, 411). Harman is using c here
to refer to “degree of confirmation,” and “e(h) if sub h” refers to the subjunctive
conditional: e is true under the assumption of h. Essentially, Harman seems to
hold that assessment of relative explanatory power is a matter of likelihood
ratios.
Harman (1973) substitutes an “explanatory” for Goldman’s “causal” theory
of knowledge, again appealing to IBE as a way of addressing Gettier problems.
However, both of these moves assimilate abductive inference to IBE, and IBE
to relative likelihood, such that it becomes unclear whether abductive inference
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is distinct from other forms of confirmation. Abduction is no longer in the
context of “discovery” but is thoroughly in the context of “justification.”
Similarly, van Fraassen (1980) places IBE in the context of justification and
argues that it fails as a method of confirmation. For, if we use the Bayesian
method of updating, and give an “additional boost” to hypotheses that are
better explanations (above and beyond the probabilities of such hypotheses
founded on evidence), then we will be subject to a Dutch book argument.
Van Fraassen essentially takes IBE to be a rule of induction—and a rule for
updating, prescribing how to update our opinions in view of evidence. It is
Bayes’s theorem, plus extra for explanatory considerations.
In contrast, Thagard argued for a variety of explanatory virtues as playing a
role in theory choice: consilience, simplicity, and analogy. Thagard goes some
way toward giving precise definitions of each of these notions. However, and
this is very important, he insists that at least part of the process of inferring to
the best theory involves pragmatic considerations. That is, for example, in the
case of consilience, deciding which facts constitute a class or kind of fact
depends importantly on historical context and background knowledge: “In
inferring the best explanation, what matters is not the sheer number of facts
explained, but the variety, and variety is not a notion for which we can expect
a neat formal characterization” (Thagard 1978, 83). Likewise, with respect to
simplicity, Thagard argues that it is a function of the size and the nature of the
set of auxiliary hypotheses; how we count auxiliaries is again a matter for the
messy historical details and background knowledge in any particular field.
More recently, Thagard has developed a computational theory of explanatory
coherence. On his view, an account of abduction should “[go] far beyond the
account that takes abduction to be a form of inference: q, if p, then q; maybe p”
(Thagard 2007, 228). He argues that there are neural mechanisms for ab-
duction and that positive emotions are associated with the discovery of a
hypothesis.
Thagard takes both discovery and justification of scientific theories to often
be the result of abduction. Abductive inferences, thus, may be weak or strong;
stronger such inferences involve multiple abductions, showing that a theory
explains a variety of facts. The examples of Darwin and the wave theorists show
that analogies figure in arguments concerning the best explanation. Because
analogy is a factor in choosing the best explanation, there is no logic of discovery
distinct from the logic of justification. Analogy may be used either to direct
inquiry toward certain kinds of hypotheses or to support hypotheses already
discovered (Thagard 1978, 90). This view is far closer to that of Peirce (see,
e.g., EP 1:196–97, 1:300). However, Peirce does take pains to distinguish
arguments from hypothesis from arguments from analogy (EP 1:34).
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Lipton has argued (2004) that IBE is a distinctive form of nondeductive
inference. On Lipton’s view, there is an important distinction between likeli-
ness and loveliness of a purported explanation. What makes an explanation
lovely is the possession of such theoretical virtues as simplicity and unifying
power. IBE and Bayes are consistent, not competing accounts of nondeductive
inference. One might coordinate (but not reduce) theoretical virtues associated
with the ‘best explanation’ with Bayesian priors and likelihoods—“loveliness”
might be a guide to “likeliness.” In other words, Lipton’s is a nonreductive
account.
What all these competing views have in common is an attempt to balance
two goals that have, historically, been somewhat in tension in philosophy of
science. On the one hand, one wishes to offer a systematic and normative
account of how science “should” go, if one wishes to argue that scientists are
empirically guided folk, with good reasons for their choices. On the other hand,
philosophers from the ’60s through the ’80s were facing a series of challenges
from historians and sociologists of science to the effect that scientific commu-
nities were guided by values and virtues that were not always reducible to, or
explainable in terms of, empiricist virtues. That is, it appeared, at least accord-
ing to the new historicism, that science does not always advance by a steady
march of confirmation by more and better evidence. Arguably, the debate
about abduction, when and whether it is warranted, and how was reflecting
a larger debate in philosophy of science more generally, about how to acknowl-
edge historical insight into the nature of scientific practice but maintain the
“philosopher’s” role of setting out normative standards for scientific reasoning.
7. Compatibilism: A Middle Ground between Reductionism
and the Heuristic Stance?
An interesting recent trend in the literature on IBE attempts to reconcile these
competing tendencies. What I will call the “compatibilist” trend treats the
reductive and nonreductive views as compatible, rather than at odds (Okasha
2000; McGrew 2003; Lipton 2004). On this view, IBE is a sort of heuristic,
helping us to meet Bayesian standards. That is, explanatory considerations are
shorthand for what amount to appeals to priors.
However,Weisberg (2009) has argued that this solution is no solution at all,
insofar as it holds IBE hostage to subjectivist Bayesianism, essentially “robbing
IBE of much of its substance and interest” (125). In other words, according to
Weisberg, those who take IBE to be reducible to Bayesian confirmation are,
essentially, attempting to solve the formalization indeterminacy problem, per-
haps at the expense of the descriptive problem. Similarly, Schupbach and
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Sprenger (2011) argue that a probabilistic measure of explanatory power may
be modeled formally. Essentially, theirs is a strategy of “saving” IBE without
reducing it to Bayes’s rule.
8. Conclusion
The history of the controversy over abduction often has to do with an exclusive
focus on one of the several problems identified above, to the exclusion of others.
The reductionists focus exclusively on what I have called Peirce’s formalization
indeterminacy and justification problems, pushing the problem of abduction
(sometimes assimilated into IBE) into the problem of characterizing the con-
text of justification, not the context of discovery. Neo-Hansonians attempt to
save abduction as a process of discovery, sometimes at the expense of addressing
any justificatory problems.
However, both extremes suffer. Reductionists are correct to worry about the
problem of a warrant for abduction. That is, abduction is an incredibly weak
form of argument that does not give us any definite probabilities or likelihoods.
However, this would have been no surprise to Peirce. According to Peirce, ab-
duction is at best useful in prescribing a course of action, namely, the tentative
adoption of a belief, to guide further investigation.
Abduction does involve weighing hypotheses one against another, due to
both evidential considerations and other more pragmatic considerations. So,
Bayes’s rule and likelihood ratios approximate, but do not capture in full, ab-
ductive inference’s role in science, exactly because abduction is not concerned
exclusively with testing or confirmation but with the extended strategic process
of discovery and investigation of hypotheses worth exploring (Hintikka 1998;
Paalova 2004, 2006). While I agree with reductionists that what count as good
explanations or tentative hypotheses are importantly tied to background theory
and evidence, it is impossible to find a principled way to map explanationist
virtues onto priors and likelihoods. While reductionists may see this as a prob-
lem with explanationist virtues, an alternative view, which Peirce perhaps an-
ticipated, is that this is a problem with the formalism, not the explanationist
virtues. Formalizing what amounts to a strategic series of choices, often guided
by pragmatic virtues like the ease or lesser expense of testing some hypotheses
over others, seems to miss an important part of scientific practice.
While there are several adequate ways to formally represent abduction or
IBE in terms of likelihoods and priors, the formalism largely underdetermines
scientific practice. However, it does not, at least not obviously, follow that
discovery is irrational or merely a random stroke of “insight.” I venture to
suggest that Peirce knew this well; the intertwined processes of discovery and
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justification in science do not, at least not with any ease, admit of formalization.
As Ben-Menahem argues, “when trying to lay down standards of explanatory
merit, the philosopher often envisages a different type of standard than that
which is commonly used in real day-to-day assessments of explanatory merit.
Since he looks for structural features which are general enough to characterize
all adequate explanations, he pays less attention to more detailed, nonstructural
standards which each particular discipline develops and which, as a matter of
course, vary with time and context” (1990, 325).
In sum, Peirce left a legacy of unanswered questions about abduction.
Open questions about abduction include
Can or should we formalize abduction? If so, how?
Does abduction commit a simple error of reasoning, for example,
affirming the consequent? Or, is abduction a form of inference that
should be judged on different grounds from deduction?
Is abduction the same or different from induction? May one be reduced
to the other? Which way does the reduction go?
Is abduction the same or different from IBE?
Is abduction a method of discovery, confirmation, or both?
Is abductive “discovery” formally or otherwise distinct from abductive
“confirmation”?
Is there a continuous range of applications of abduction in science?
If so, does the aim of abductive inference change by application or
context—is it sometimes aimed at truth and sometimes at something
rather different (e.g., a hypothesis worth investigating—for reasons
including but not exclusively limited to probable truth)?
Is the narrowing of considerations to plausible hypotheses part of the
process of abduction? Is it part of IBE? Or is it before both?
If IBE belongs in the realm of confirmation and abduction in the realm
of discovery, when does abduction become IBE?
The above questions are open in part because we have not (once and for all)
answered prior questions about the aim of philosophy of science. Is philosophy
of science a matter of describing scientific practice or prescribing sound forms
of inference or both? Can or should philosophy of science investigate scientific
discovery or only contexts of justification; should or can they be treated in-
dependently? Should philosophy of science (like ethical theory of late) be in-
structed or constrained by empirical facts about how we do reason? If we find
that we commonly use a form of inference as a rule of thumb that turns out to
violate what we know or believe to be the canons of “good reasoning,” should
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we rethink our canons, our rationality, or both? The philosophical conversation
about abduction has occasionally run into irresolvable deadlocks exactly
because the authors of opposing views answer these questions differently. All
these issues arise in the context of discussions of abduction exactly because
Peirce left the door open to options that many today treat as closed.
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